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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
PETER DOENGES, MILES CROCKARD,
WILLIAM BOWEN, RICHARD H. WATSON
CARL PETERSON, and EMIGRATION
'
IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT,
Plaintiff-Respondents,
-vs-

CITY OF SALT LAKE CITY, a municipal
corporation: EMIGRATION PROPERTIES
PARTNERSHIP, a Utah limited partnership, BOWERS-SORENSON CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, and
FRED A. SMOLKA,

Case No. 16649

Defendant-Appellants.

THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiff-Respondents brought suit in the Third
Judicial District Court, the Honorable Judge Dean E. Conder,
seeking to have Utah Code Ann. 10-2-401 (1953, as amended,
1977) declared unconstitutional as a violation of the Equal
Protection clause of both the United States and Utah Constitutions.
DISPOSITION BELOW
Lower court granted Plaintiff-Respondents' Motion
for Summary Judgment and found Utah Code Ann. 10-2-401 (1953,
as amended in 1977) unconstitutional.
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT
POSITION AS AMICUS CURIAE
Amicus neither supports nor opposes this particular
annexation, but contends that the Utah municipal annexation
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

law cited above, granting a petition right to real property
owners but denying it to interested and affected non-property
owners, is an unconstitutional denial of Equal ProL_ction.
Amicus prays the Supreme Court affirm the lower court's
holding that the municipal annexation statute, 10-2-401 (as
amended, 1977), is unconstitutional.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Amicus concurs in Plaintiff-Respondents' statement
of facts and hereby expressly incorporates it by reference.
ARGUMENT
I

SECTION 10-2-401 (AS AMENDED, 1977), BY
GRANTING A RIGHT OF FRANCHISE BY PETITION
TO OWNERS OF REAL PROPERTY IN THE ANNEXATION AREA, BUT DENYING THAT RIGHT TO
INTERESTED AND AFFECTED NON-PROPERTY
OWNERS IN THE SAME AREA, DENIES A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT OF EQUAL PARTICIPATION IN
POLITICAL AFFAIRS AND, BY SO DOING,
VIOLATES THE EQUAL PROTECTION PROVISIONS
OF THE UNITED STATES AND UTAH CONSTITUTIONS.
A.

THE QUESTION AT ISSUE DOES NOT CONCERN THE LEGISLATIVE
GRANT OF POWER TO MUNICIPALITIES, OR THE MUNICIPALITIES'
EXERCISE THEREOF; IT CONCERNS AN IMPROPER DISTINCTION
BETWEEN PROPERTY OWNERS AND NON-PROPERTY OWNERS WHICH
VIOLATES EQUAL PROTECTION.
It is essential, at the outset, to establish what

exactly is at issue in this case.

The issue does not revolve

around the legislature's power to establish reasonable means
whereby cities may annex unincorporated areas; rather, the
issue is whether the legislature, after establishing an
annexation procedure which grants a statutory franchise by
petition to one set of interested annexees, may deny the sa~
right of petition to another set of equally interested and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-2-

affected annexees.

It cannot be denied that this second set

of annexees--residents whose names do not appear on the
latest property tax rolls--has a direct and

substa11~ial

interest in the public facilities and services, and the costs
therefor, which are involved in annexation into a municipal
government and should be allowed to participate politically
in the annexation to the same extent that property owners
participate.

The burdens of annexation do not rest exclusively

or even primarily on property taxpayers, but are borne by
every inhabitant, renter, and consumer in the annexed area.
The U. S. Supreme Court has found on numerous occasions that
the difference between the interests of property owners and
non-property owners are not sufficiently substantial to
justify excluding non-property owners from the political
process and that any law which permits political participation by persons having only a remote interest in the affairs
at issue, while excluding others who have a distinct and
direct interest is a violation of Equal Protection.

Phoenix v.

Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204, 209 (1970); Kramer v. Union Free
School District, 395 U.S. 621, 632-633 (1969).
The cases cited by Appellants hit wide of the mark
by

raising issues, not of denial of equal participation in a

petition process, but concerning the power of the legislature
to pick reasonable annexation procedures which do not burden
equal protection and of the power of cities to annex within
those procedures.

Here there is no issue as to whether an

elective process must be established in the first place;
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Amicus recognizes that the Supreme Court has never found a
constitutional right to any election.

The Court has, how-

ever, found that once an elective process is estribl ished
-

'

qualified individuals with a legitimate interest must be
allowed to vote.

For example, in Torres v. Village of Capit~,

92 N.M. 64 (1978), the New Mexico Supreme Court never reaches
the question of whether a petition system is similar enough
to an election to invoke equal protection, it only finds that
the legislature has the power to establish an annexation
system which has no election at all.

Indeed, the question of

discrimination against non-property owners which this court
must resolve could not have been considered by the Torres
court, as it had no non-property owners before it.

Likewise,

the California case of Weber v. City Council, 9 Cal.3d 950
(1973), only stands for the proposition that the legislature
can establish an annexation process which has no voting or
petitioning process, it says nothing about equal protection
when a petition process has been established.
The cases of Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S.
161 (1907); Child v. City of Spanish Fork, _ _ Utah 2d
538 P.2d 184 (1975); Bradshaw v. Beaver City, 27 Utah 2d 135
(1972); and Cottonwood City Electors v. Salt Lake County, 28
Utah 2d 121 (1972), all relied upon by Appellant, deal only
· · 1 govern·
with the power of the legislature to create mun1c1pa
ments and confer authority on them, not at issue here.
. . 1.i t Y ' s power granted
Indeed, the extensive reach o f a mun1c1pa
by the state and recognized in Hunter is still severely
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limited by the reach of the Equal Protection clause.

Curtis

v. Board of Supervisors, 7 Cal.3d 942 (1972).
Lastly, the issue is not one that may 12 ~esolved
under the Due Process clause.
ville City,

Utah 2d

~'

The case of Freeman v. Center600 P.2d 1003 (1979), in examining

10-2-401, considered only the due process rights to notice
and hearing, not the equal protection distinction between
property owners and non-property owners.

Appellants' due

process argument that non-property owners may participate in
the annexation hearings held before the City Commission has
nothing to do with the equal protection issue now before the
Court.
The equal protection standard which this Court must
apply, and which controls the real issue that must be resolved,
has been defined by Chief Justice Warren Burger as that
protection which denies
" ... to States the power to legislate that
different treatment be accorded to persons
placed by a statute into different classes
on the basis of criteria wholly unrelated
to the objective of that statute. A
classification must be reasonable, not
arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground
of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly
circumstanced shall be treated alike."
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1971).
B.

THE PETITION PROCESS, ESTABLISHING A MEANS BY WHICH
INTERESTED AND AFFECTED LOCAL CITIZENS MAY EXPRESS APPROVAL
OR DISAPPROVAL OF AN ANNEXATION, IS SO SIMILAR TO THE
ELECTORAL PROCESS THAT EQUAL PROTECTION GUARANTEES MUST
BE APPLIED.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-5-

The essence of Appellants' case lies in an artificial
distinction between the petitiori process involved here and ~
election.

It is clear that both systems are means ly which

the government determines if sufficient public support exists
to elect a candidate, resolve an issue, or change a system of
government.

In this case the receipt or denial of substantial

rights and services, to be granted by a large municipality,
directed by elected representatives, and cloaked with general
governmental authority and police power, hangs on this deter·
mination of popular support.

The question then is whether

this court will find that minor differences in the form and
procedure of public participation in an election vis-a-vis
the petition process are substantial enough to label the
latter as less than a fundamental interest.
In proposing this artificial distinction, Appellants
rely on dicta in the Freeman case that the petition is only a
"triggering process".

Though perhaps a "trigger", it is a

trigger with all the force of an election in terms of the
positive, substantial influence cast over the final decision
by city government, this especially so considering that
non-property owners are excluded from a political process
which either confers or completely denies annexation powers
to the municipality.
The fact that annexation is a two-tiered process,
with the petition followed by a city commission decision
is not dispositive because

1.

f

1· t

were an election triggering,

but not binding, a city government decision, equal protectioo
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guard11Lees would clearly apply.

This was the result in

Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, where a two-step process--election
followed by city government decision--controlled ·~~issuance
of general obligation bonds.

399 U.S. 204, 206 (1970).

Kolodziejski held that in those circumstances, a restriction
of the franchise to property owners violated equal protection.
Amicus would also submit that even if the petition
is only a trigger, that it is equivalent to a candidate's
obtaining of a place on a general election ballot in that it
assures that a candidate (or an annexation) has at least a
modicum of serious public support before binding elections
(or hearings by the City Commission) are held.

The Supreme

Court has recognized an extension of the fundamental voting
rights analysis to participation in political party primaries
and to candidates' access to the ballot.

Kusper v. Pontikes,

414 U.S. 51 (1973); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
This fundamental rights analysis is aided by the consideration
that in Utah there is only one means of annexation:

city

government action based on a determination of popular support.
The cases of Torres v. Village of Capitan, supra, and Berry v.
Bourne, 588 F.2d 422 (4th Cir. 1978), are thereby rendered
less persuasive as they dealt with New Mexico and South
Carolina statutes which allowed a city to complete an annexation by any of several means; that is, the city could still
annex if there were no showing of local popular support--a
significant difference from the Utah law.
Even if this Court found that the minor procedural
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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differences between an election and a petition rendered the
right to equal participation in the petition process less
fundamental than election participation, the Cou::t' s obligation of "active and critical analysis" is not limited to
elections or electoral qualifications but extends to laws
"touching upon" the right to vote or to participate in politi·
cal affairs.
at 544.

Curtis v. Board of Supervisors, supra, 501 P.2d

The United States Supreme Court has also recognized

that fundamental rights

anal~sis

extends beyond the right

~

vote and includes the right to equally "participate in politi·
cal affairs."

Kramer, supra, at 626.

The same equal protec-

tion standard of review used to test the constitutionality of
limitations on voting rights should be used to test statutorih
authorized petition rights.

The application of this standard

of review to classifications based on property ownership has
been carefully explained by the Supreme Court in a series of
three cases which extended the rights of non-property owners
to participate fairly in political affairs dealing with
property.

In Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., supra, the

right to vote for school board officials was extended to
those other than parents and property owners.

In Cipriano v.

City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969), the Court invalidated a
statutory restriction allowing only property owners to parti·
cipate in revenue bond elections.

Phoenix v. Kolodziejski,

supra, extended the Cipriano holding to elections approving
tv

general obligation bonds which were intimately tied to proper·
tax and which could result in liens against real property.
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These cases indicate a strong desire on the part of the Court
to dispel archaic notions that local municipalities are
supported only by property owners and to allow full participation
in political affairs to all concerned and otherwise qualified
citizens.
Analysis of the applicability of the Kramer line of
cases is furthered by a comparison of those cases with the
later case of Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water
Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973).

In Salyer, the Court

upheld a legislative scheme which restricted the vote in
water district elections to property owners.

This seeming

departure from Kramer and its progeny was justified, however,
by reason of the election's "special limited purpose and of
the disproportionate effect of its activities on landowners
as a group."

410 U.S. at 728.

The considerations of limited

authority and disproportionate effect, joined with the fact
that there was no general governmental powers granted to the
water district, were sufficient to find a substantial interest
on the part of property owners and little or no interest in
or effect upon non-property owners.
the matter here at issue is obvious:

Salyer's application to
Although the city is

literally annexing acres, rather than persons, it is not
acres that are benefited and burdened by the annexation.

The

effect of annexation does not disproportionately fall on
property owners but rather on all residents of the area,
property owners and non-property owners alike.

In addition,

the governmental unit being extended to the annexation area
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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is not one of limited purpose, but is possessed of broad
police powers and general governmental authority.

Because of

Lhese reasons the same equal protection standard ~f review
used in Kramer should be applied here to test the constitution·
ality of limiting the right of petition to property owners.
The California Supreme Court, in examining the right to
protest, by petition, an annexation, found that it could
" ... discern no reason, and respondents
suggest none, why landowners enjoy a
greater interest, or nonlandowners a
lesser in't:erest, in the formation of a
city of general powers than in its governance, or its issuance of general obligation bonds.
Nor do we find a reason, and
again respondents suggest none, why the
interest of landowners becomes more compelling, more worthy of special protection, in a protest proceeding [by petition]
than in an election.
We conclude that the principle established in Kramer, Cipriano, Kolodziejski,
and other cases applies fully to the
present case.
Nonlandowners share an
equal interest with landowners in the
formation of a city which could provide
police and fire protection, maintain
roads, acquire and develop parks, and
furnish other public services. Moreover,
cities derive revenue from many sources
besides property taxes.
Property taxes
are levied on land and improvements, not
land alone, and their burden includes
tenants as well as landowners." Curtis v.
Board of Supervisors, supra, 501 P.2d at

550.
When 10-2-401 was originally enacted in 1898, the
legislature must have intended that no annexation would
proceed without the approval of the populace involved, otherwi:
there would have been no petition provision.

Now, some
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BO

years later, when municipal revenues have shifted significantly
away from property taxation and when cases like Kramer dictate
that all qualified residents, not just property owners, have
a legitimate right to participate in local government, this
legislative intent that an annexation be based on an expression
of popular support by those most affected stands to be frustrated.
This frustration is brought about in two ways:

first, the

property owner restriction prohibits participation by a
significant portion of the affected populace; second, the
property owner restriction creates a major distortion of the
size of the population to be considered and of the size of
the majority required to sign.

It is this dilution of repre-

sentation and distortion of the "majority" which constitutes
a violation of the one man-one vote strand of equal protection
analysis.
By granting the petition right to land rather than
to people, 10-2-401 ignores the observation of Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964), that government represents
"people, not trees or acres.

Legislators are selected by

voters, not farms or cities or economic interests."

Where,

as here, the annexation area is controlled by a few large
landowners, those landowners--be they ranchers, developers,
entrepreneurs, or businesses--can, by gerrymandering, manipulate an annexation area to the point where the attitudes and
interests of a majority of the landowners are completely
adverse to those of the non-property owning residents.
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"In addition to limiting the class of
persons eligible to sign a petition to
residents of a single area, states frequently bar certain groups of residents
f:om signing.
The class of eligible
signers may be limited to property owners,
freeholders, taxpayers, or inhabitants
in~tead of voters.
It would seem appropriate to apply the principles of the
franchise restriction cases to these
restrictions on eligible signers, for
both f~rms of restriction give a particular
economic group a veto on a proposition
with which others are also substantially
concerned.
Viewed in this light, such
signer limitations appear clearly unconstitutional. The Right to Vote in Municipal Annexations, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1571,
1606-1607 (1975). (Emphasis added).
See also, Utah Law on Municipal Boundary Changes--Anarchy
Among Modern City-States, 1977 Utah L. Rev. 697, 701-704,
where serious questions are raised concerning the constitutionality of Section 10-2-401.
The U.S. Supreme Court has recently examined the
right of equal participation in a petition process which was
limited to property owners.

The Court summarily reversed a

lower court ruling that found no one man-one vote problems
in the landowner classification.

While it offered no ruling

on the merits of the arguments there advanced by appellants,
the Court observed that "it is fair to say that they are not
insubstantial."

Concerned Citizens of So. Ohio, Inc. v. P~

Creek Conservancy Dist., 429 U.S. 651, 653 (1977).
One last consideration:

Appellants have not pre·

sented, nor can Amicus conceive of, a single rational reaso~
to distinguish between an election and a statutory petitioo
process.

Both are expressions of popular support which
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differ only in the procedures by which they are administered.
There is no constitutional magic about the election process;
elections themselves are not universally guarantnc? by the
Constitution.

But the Supreme Court has found that equal

participation in an election, even one which is not binding
on the government's final decision, is a fundamental right.
The same standards must be applied to the right of equal
participation in political processes which influence, by
popular determination, the form of a local representative
government, even though those processes differ procedurally
from the standard election system.
II
THE ANNEXATION STATUTE, BY DENYING A
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT OF EQUAL POLITICAL
PARTICIPATION, MUST BE SUPPORTED BY A
COMPELLING STATE INTEREST. THE STATUTE
FAILS NOT ONLY THE COMPELLING STATE
INTEREST TEST, BUT ALSO THE MILDER REQUIREMENT OF SATISFYING A SUBSTANTIAL STATE
INTEREST.
The requirement that a statute which restricts a
fundamental right must be supported by a compelling state
interest in the classification is well established.
supra.

Kramer,

It is also well established that few, if any, statutes

have ever survivied the strict judicial scrutiny of the
compelling state interest test.

Amicus contends that the

annexation statute does, indeed, infringe on a fundamental
right of equal participation in political affairs and that
thus the compelling state interest requirement would have to
be s<ltisfied.

It should be obvious that the State can point

to nn interest so compelling that the strict scrutiny test
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could be met: Appellants ha\·e not e\·en attempted to estab'-,
.
... - - c~~:

that a compelling state interest justifies the proper:v
distinction.

It is, furthermore. the contention -•

-\m:~~s

that the annexation statute is supported by no state intere;:
not rational, reasonable. substantial, nor compelling.
Appellants advance several possible

justificatio~;

for the classification bet1-.-een property 01.-ning and non-pro;::e::·
owning petitioners and for the exclusion of the latter

gro~;

The most obvious justification might be that such a restriction, to property owners on the last tax rolls, makes it
administratively more convenient for the city to act on a
petition.

But it is clear that administrative convenience _,

an insufficient justification for a restriction of voting
rights.

Carrington v. Rush, 380 C. S. 89, 96 ( 1965) .

This .,

especially so when there is an insubstantial savings for the
city, where there are alternative means which are not marke~:~
less convenient, and where there is a deprivation of importa~:
rights.

Here, there are many reasonable and non-burdensome

alternatives; for example, the simple expedient of allo~ing
property owners and registered voters to participate, 1o;hich
would allow participation by all interested residents.

Any

increased burden, such as determining 1.·ho are residents at a
given point in time, would be no more substantial than in a~
election.
Other possible justifications are that property
owners bear a disproportionate burden of supporting a munic:pality as compared to non-property owners.

If that 1-;ere a
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oc.:fr:cier.t justification, the Kramer - Cipriano - Kolodziejski
::~e

of cases ~ould have been decided differently.

~~en

a smaller percentage of city revenues is

Today,

depen~ent

on

:. :·c>perr_\· tax and 1o.·hen that ta." burden is passed on to renters,
:onsumers, and other residents by the property owner, the
~.irden

of property ta." is not disproportionate.

The property

01>ner distinction might also be justified as a protection of
:ocal interests, by leaving the annexation decision to property
O'-llers 1>.'ho are tied to the land.

This justification is

1;i thou t merit where, as here, the property owners are those
on ta." rolls which may, because there is no outer time limit
on an annexation proceeding, be several years old by the time
annexation is completed.

This justification also fails where

the landowners are large businesses and entrepreneurs who
ha\'e no interest more local than their own pocketbooks.

The

"tax colony" justification advanced by Appellants is obviously
inapplicable where the annexation procedure requires some
basis in local popular support and the classification distinguishes between property owners and non-property owners, both
of

~horn

colony.

l>.'ould have the same interest in maintaining a tax
Lastly, the notion that such an unfair discrimina-

tion is supported by the fact that non-property owners have
alternate means of representation is patently inapplicable
here, 1>.'here they are granted no vote; no petition right; no
representation on the city council; and, as the 1977 law
provided, no guarantee of a public hearing.
An imaginative court might still be able to conSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ceive of some possible rational basis for such a distincti%
and thereby satisfy a rational basis test.

But analysis of

equal protection guarantees has changed from the ol · rational
basis test.

It is clear that the U.S. Supreme Court requires

more than some wishful, conceivable state interest.

Today,

even when not applying the strict scrutiny/compelling state
interest test, the Supreme Court requires that governmental
classifications or means must substantially further the
statutory objective.

Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971);

Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).

Likewise, the Court

will no longer hypothesize some conceivable legislative
purpose in the absence of an articulated legislative purpose.
McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263 (1973).
The archaic nature of the distinction between
property owners and non-property owners will simply not
support a substantial state interest in today's world.
Eighty years ago, when this distinction was hatched, renten
were few and lifestyles and city revenues were different;
property tax is no longer the only, or even a major source of
city revenue.

The Supreme Court's rationale in Kolodziejsti

supports this contention.

There the Court recognized the

reality of passing on of property taxes to renters and consumers (399 U.S. at 210) and stated that even if there wen

°

increased burden on property owners it would be insufficient
to overcome the inequities of not allowing interested non. · t e ( a t p. 212) .
property owners to part1c1pa

If the ~
Kolodziei 5'

result is sound, where the general obligation bonds were paid
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by property taxes and became a lien on real property, then
the connection between annexation and property ownership here
is even more tenuous and can support no conceivable state
interest.

This result has been recognized by the California

Supreme Court:
"In California and in many other
states of the nation, provisions for
municipal incorporation and for changes
in the boundaries of local jurisdictions
are archaic abominations dominated by the
'horse and buggy' concepts of our rural
past.... Legislation in many states
still reflects outdated patterns where
the property tax was virtually the sole
source of local government revenue and
outdated beliefs that the people in an
area, however small, should have virtually absolute control over their 'turf'
as demarcated by city and other local
government boundaries." Curtis v. Board
of Supervisors, supra, 501 P.2d at 539.
A consideration that seems to have completely
escaped the Appellants is the possibility that there exist
alternatives by which the interests of all affected residents
may be served without substantially increasing the burden on
the city.

The Supreme Court has recognized that where less

burdensome alternatives exist they should be pursued; that
significant rights must not be sacrificed on an alter of
convenience.

"By requiring classifications to be tailored to

their purpose, we do not secretly require the impossible.
Here there is simply too attenuated a relationship between
the state interest ... and the fixed requirement."
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).

Dunn v.

It cannot be denied that

the relationship between annexation and property ownership is
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"simply too attenuated."

This principle was also recognized

in Kramer, supra, when the court ruled that the property
owner distinction was simply too imprecise to allm. partici·
pation by all interested and affected citizens.

The~

court, in requiring a more precise classification, found that
we "must consider the facts and circumstances behind the law,
the interest which the state claims to be protecting, and the
interests of those who are disadvantaged by the classificatior.
Kramer, supra, at 626.

Using this analysis, Anlicus submits

that after careful consideration of the circumstances behind
the annexation petition process, of the negligible interests
that the property owner classification claims to protect, and
of the significant loss of the franchise by directly interest<.
and affected non-property owners, that the property ownership
classification is glaringly imprecise and begs correction.
Ill

THE UTAH SUPREME COURT IS NOT BOUND BY
THE RIGIDIFIED TWO-TIERED EQUAL PROTECTION TEST UTILIZED IN THE PAST BY FEDERAL
COURTS. IN EXAMINING VIOLATIONS OF
UTAH'S EQUAL PROTECTION GUARANTEES, OUR
COURTS MAY UTILIZE A MORE REALISTIC
ANALYSIS ARISING BETWEEN THE EXTREMES OF
THE RATIONAL BASIS TEST AND THE STRICT
SCRUTINY TEST.
Even if this Court found that there were no violatio:
of a fundamental right to equal participation in political
affairs and that there is some state interest at stake in
this case, Anlicus would submit that the District Court's
decision still must be affirmed. This Court is not limited to
the two extremes of either the strict scrutiny test, which
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111
'

statute has passed, or the rational basis test, which no
statute has failed.

Those two tests are not mutually exclu-

sive, but are, rather, two ends of a spectrum of possible
approaches in equal protection cases.

The tests are like

looking at a nearby object through either end of a telescope-both views are unrealistic and distorted, with one being
grossly deferential and the other overly critical.

Concern-

ing this point, Justice Marshall has written:
"I must once more voice my disagreement with the Court's rigidified approach
to equal protection analysis. [Citations
omitted]. The Court apparently seeks to
establish today that equal protection
cases fall into one of two neat categories
which dictate the appropriate standard of
review--strict scrutiny or mere rationality. But this Court's decisions in the
field of equal protection defy such easy
categorization. A principled reading of
what this Court has done reveals that it
has applied a spectrum of standards in
viewing discrimination allegedly violative
of the Equal Protection Clause. This
spectrum clearly comprehends variations
in the degree of care with which the
Court will scrutinize particular cl,assifications, depending, I believe, on the
constitutional and societal importance of
the interest adversely affected and the
recognized invidiousness of the basis
upon which the particular classification
is drawn." Dissent, San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.

1, 98-99 (1973).

Justice White has also found that "it is clear that
we employ not just one, or two, but, as my brother Marshall
has so ably demonstrated, a 'spectrum of standards'"·
rence, Vlandis v. Kline, 412, U.S. 441, 458 (1973).

ConcurWhile

the Court has never embraced, in name, the spectrum approach
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of Justices Marshall and White ' it is clear from recent cases
that the Court has recogized that intermediate levels of
scrutiny exist.

Beginning in 1972, the Court madE'

l

signifi·

cant effort to formulate a single standard of review applicabi
to all equal protection cases and also utilized the spectrw
approach in conjunction with a less burdensome alternatives
test.

Weber v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 406 U.S.

(1972); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).

I~

In 1974, the

Court, in an eight to one opinion in Jimenez v. Weinberger,
applied an intermediate level of scrutiny--more than rational
basis, but without finding any suspect classification or
fundamental right, either of which would require strict
scrutiny.

In the Jimenez case, dealing with the rights of

illegitimate children, the Court specifically eschewed strict
scrutiny analysis and, indeed, found that the government had
a legitimate interest, but that implementation of that
was unreasvnable.

636-637 (1974).

in~Rr

Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628,
Lastly, consider the Court's treatment of

gender-based discrimination.

Though the Court has never

found sex to be a suspect classification (the nearest it has
come is in Frontiero v. Richardson, when sex-as-a-suspectclass received four votes), it has found violations of equal
protection in some cases and found none in others.

The

result is an intermediate level of review appearing at various
points along the spectrum between rational basis and strict
scrutiny.

Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); Frontiero v.

Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
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190

(19/6).

If any case requires a legislative justification of

more than mere rationality, it is clearly this one.
In Justice Marshall's dissent he lists three considerations important when equal protection cases are reviewed
under a spectrum approach.

The court must examine the character

of the classification which the statute makes; the importance
of the rights which are restricted or denied because of the
classification; and the importance of the interest which the
state asserts.
at 99.

San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, supra,

To indicate the degree of acceptance which Marshall's

spectrum approach has received,the majority in Dunn v. Blumstein,
supra, at 335, holds that "to decide whether a law violates
the Equal Protection clause, we look, in essence, to three
things:

the character of the classification in question; the

individual interests affected by the classification; and the
governmental interests asserted in support of the classification."

A careful review of the constitutionality of the

statute in question requires an examination of those three
considerations.
First, concerning the character of the classification between property owners and non-property owners, 10-2-401
makes a three-fold discrimination between property owners and
non-property owners; between long-term property owners and
new property owners, by virtue of the "last assessment rolls"
provision; and between large property owners and small property
owners, by virtue of requiring both a majority of persons and
ont'-lhird of assessed value.

The class of those denied the
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right to participate in the petition includes many persons
rightfully concerned, interested, and affected by the

annexa-

tion, namely property owners who have purchased si1.ce the
last assessment (which could, incidentally, be a long time,
considering that the statute put no limit on the vitality of
a petition between its signing and the completion of the
annexation), contract buyers, renters and other adults who
live with property owners, and any other inhabitant of the
annexation area who may be an otherwise qualified voter, ~t
whose name does not appear on the tax rolls.

The property

owners, on the other hand, who are permitted to petition,
need not be registered voters; residents of the annexation
T~

area or of the state; adults; or even natural persons.

classification is based solely on property ownership of some
duration, without regard for the interests of those who would
be most intimately affected, interested, and knowledgeable
about the annexation and the area which it involves.
short, the classification has no reasonable

In

relationship~

the goal of determining the wishes of those affected by an
annexation.
Second, concerning the importance of the rights
asserted by the disadvantaged class, it is unquestioned that
the non-property owners have a substantial and proper interes:
in the public facilities and services, and the costs therefor
which are involved in an annexation.

Kramer, supra, teaches

that a law which permits inclusion of those having only a
remote interest in local affairs, while excluding many ot~r
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who have a distinct and direct interest, is a violation of
equal protection.

This Court must carefully examine such a

law ''because statutes distributing the franchise constitute
the foundation of our representative society.

Any unjustified

discrimination in determining who may participate in political
affairs or in the selection of public officials undermines
the legitimacy of our representative government."
supra, at 626.

Kramer,

The potential for harm to non-property owners'

interests when an annexation, bringing with it as it does, a
representative government of broad powers and general authority,
is railroaded through by a few big businesses or entrepreneurs
is obvious.
The substantial impact which the petition, by
itself, has on the decision of city government is undeniable
and, together with the fact that existence of a two-tiered
decision process does not save an unequal distribution of the
franchise, indicates that access to the petition, even if it
is only a trigger, is a fundamental right.

The equal protec-

tion infirmities of 10-2-401 cannot be cured by asserting, as
Appellants do, that non-property owners have a voice in later
procedures; the same could be said of any denial of the
franchise which is subject to review by judicial or administrative tribunals.

Besides, the statute did not, at the

time, even require that such later procedures be open to the
public.

Important rights of fair and equal participation in

political affairs have been denied to non-property owners by
•h~ ~tatute

in question.
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Third, concerning the importance of the interests
which the state asserts, much of what has been argued above
at Section II could be repeated here.

Suffice it to say tha:

Appellants' assertion that some wishful, conceivable state
interest will save this statute is not enough; governmental
means must be substantially related to governmental ends.
Craig v. Boren, supra; Reed v. Reed, supra; McGinnis v.
Royster, supra.

No substantial interest has been here pre-

sented.
"We can discern no reason, and
respondents suggest none, why landowners
enjoy a greater interest, or nonlandowners a lesser interest, in the formation
of a city of general powers than in its
governance, or its issuance of general
obligation bonds.
Nor do we find a
reason, and again respondents suggest
none, why the interest of landowners
becomes more compelling, more worthy of
special protection, in a protest proceeding [by petition] than in an election."
Curtis v. Board of Supervisors, supra,
501 P.2d at 550.
CONCLUSION
Appellants have not suggested, nor can Amicus
conceive of, any reason to distinguish between an election
and a statutory petition process which is created to ser~u
a method by which those who are most affected can vote to
extend or deny annexation jurisdiction to a municipal go~~
ment.

The two-tiered nature of the annexation procedure;

that is, petition followed by city commission approval, is
not alone disposi tive as in similar situations the guarantee!
of the Equal Protection clause have been extended.
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Non-p~~

owners who are directly affected by and intimately concerned
with an annexation have a right to participate in the annexation to the same extent that property owners participate.
Any statute which unfairly distributes a right of franchise,
even by petition, violates a fundamental right to equal
participation in political affairs and, as such, must be
supported by a compelling state interest.

The statute here

at issue is not supported by any state interest, not compelling,
substantial, nor rational.

Even if the petition right were

construed as not fundamental and if it were found that the
state has some interest, this Court is not bound by the gross
deference of the rational basis test or the excessive severity
of the compelling state interest test, but may forge a new
test between those extremes, consisting of an examination of
the nature of the rights restricted, the characteristics of
the disadvantaged class, the nature of the state's interest,
and the precision of the relationship between statutory means
and ends.

Such a test must be resolved in favor of equal

political participation by all those affected and the result
must be an affirmation of the District Court's finding that
10-2-401, Utah Code Ann. (1953), is unconstitutional.
Respectfully submitted,
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